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Big changes are occurring in 
forensic science, particularly 
among experts who compare 
the patterns found in finger-
prints, footwear impressions, 
toolmarks, handwriting, and 
the like. Forensic examiners 
are reaching conclusions in 
new ways and changing the 
language they use in reports 
and testimony. This article 
explains these changes and 
the challenges they pose for 
lawyers and judges. 
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Although testimony about forensic 
comparisons has been offered in court 
for over a century, it has recently become 
controversial. Questions have emerged 
about the scientific foundation of the 
pattern-matching disciplines and about 
the logic underlying forensic scientists’ 
conclusions. The traditional assump-
tion that items like fingerprints and 
toolmarks have unique patterns that 
allow experts to accurately determine 
their source has been challenged and is 
being replaced by a new logic of foren-
sic reporting. The new logic requires 
experts to evaluate and weigh probabili-
ties rather than claim certainty. Forensic 
experts must now moderate the claims 
they make about their own accuracy and, 
increasingly, use numbers to describe the 
strength of their conclusions. Because 
these changes have important impli-
cations for the probative value of the 
conclusions that forensic experts offer in 
court, it is important that judges under-
stand them. 
THE DEMISE OF THE THEORY  
OF DISCERNIBLE UNIQUENESS
As recently as a decade ago, forensic 
scientists in the pattern-matching disci-
plines told a common story when asked 
to explain how they reached conclu-
sions. Their analytic process began 
with the assumption that the items 
they examined had unique patterns: For 
example, every finger was said to have 
a unique set of friction ridges, and thus 
every print left by a given finger (if suffi-
cient in size and clarity) was expected 
to be different from the print made by 
any other finger. Similarly, every gun 
barrel was thought to be unique; hence 
the pattern of marks found on bullets 
fired through a given barrel (if suffi-
cient in size and clarity) was expected to 
differ from the pattern found on bullets 
fired through any other gun barrel. The 
soles of shoes and human dentition also 
were presumed to be unique, and thus 
the impressions left by a given shoe, 
or a given set of teeth (if sufficiently 
clear and detailed) were assumed to 
differ from the impressions left by any 
other shoe or set of teeth. Applying the 
same analysis, everyone’s handwriting 
was presumed to be unique, and hence 
a sample of handwriting from a given 
individual (if sufficiently extensive) was 
presumed to be distinguishable from 
the handwriting of any other individual. 
These presumptions have been called the 
theory of discernible uniqueness.1
According to this traditional 
account, the job of the forensic examiner 
was first to assess whether the patterns 
seen in impressions contained sufficient 
detail to allow a determination of source 
and, second, to compare the impres-
sion patterns. If sufficient detail was 
available, then a “match” between the 
patterns meant the source of the impres-
sions must necessarily be the same, and 
a mismatch (failure to match) meant 
that the source of the impressions must 
necessarily be different. If insufficient 
detail was available to make a definitive 
determination, then the examination 
was inconclusive. 
Examiners in a number of foren-
sic disciplines have testified that this 
analysis allows them to make source 
determinations with complete certainty. 
A prominent fingerprint examiner 
explained the matter as follows: 
Fingerprint examiners routinely claim to 
have “identified” or “individualized” an 
unknown mark to a single known print. 
This identification is often characterized 
as being “to the exclusion of all others” on 
earth to a 100 [percent] certainty, and 
the comparison method used is claimed 
to have a zero percent error rate. These 
claims are based on the premises that fric-
tion ridge skin is unique and permanent.2 
Unfortunately, these claims have not 
withstood scientific scrutiny. Indeed, 
commentary on the issue in the broader 
scientific and academic communities 
(beyond the community of forensic 
science practitioners) has been nearly 
unanimous in dismissing such claims as 
unwarranted.3
Consider the claim that the ridge 
patterns on every finger are unique. 
Like similar claims about snowflakes, 
it is impossible to demonstrate empiri-
cally that this claim is true because one 
cannot conduct a systematic compar-
ison of every finger against every 
other. Furthermore, there is a differ-
ence between the claim that the ridge 
pattern on each finger is unique and 
the claim that a fingerprint examiner 
can accurately determine whether two 
fingerprints were made by the same 
finger. The validity of the latter also 
depends on the quality of the prints and 
the level of analysis employed during 
the comparison. Even if the ridge detail 
of every finger were unique, it does not 
follow that every impression made by 
every finger will always be distinguish-
able from every impression made by 
any other finger, particularly when the 
impressions are of poor quality (e.g., 
limited detail, smudged, distorted, or 
overlaid on another impression). By 
analogy, it may be that every human face 
is unique, but we can still mistake one 
person for another, particularly when 
comparing poor-quality photos.4 
This is a limitation that most finger-
print examiners now acknowledge:
When fingerprint comparisons are being 
made, they are not being made from fric-
tion ridge skin to friction ridge skin. They 
are being made from one imperfect, incom-
plete recording to another. . . . [Hence] 
correctly associating a degraded mark to 
its true source is by no means a certainty, 
even were one to presume absolute unique-
ness of all friction ridge skin.5
 Consequently, the key scientific ques-
tion is not whether the ridge pattern of 
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each finger is unique, but how well an 
examiner can distinguish the impres-
sions of different fingers at the level of 
analysis applied in a forensic examina-
tion. That question cannot be answered 
by assertions about the uniqueness of 
ridge patterns; it can only be answered 
by empirical research. 
This critique also applies to other 
forensic pattern-matching disciplines, 
such as toolmark analysis, footwear 
analysis, handwriting analysis, and 
bitemark analysis. Although some prac-
titioners in these fields persist in making 
the injudicious claim that their conclu-
sions must be accurate because they are 
comparing patterns that are unique, the 
broader scientific community has called 
for empirical studies to put such claims 
to the test. 
A key event in the evolution of 
forensic science opinion was a 2009 
report by the United States National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), which 
called for the development of “quan-
tifiable measures of the reliability 
and accuracy of forensic analyses” that 
reflect “actual practice on realistic case 
scenarios . . . .”6 It called for research to 
establish “the limits of reliability and 
accuracy that analytic methods can be 
expected to achieve as the conditions 
of forensic evidence vary.”7 The report 
concluded that “much forensic evidence 
— including, for example, bitemarks 
and firearm and tool mark identifica-
tions — is introduced in criminal trials 
without any meaningful scientific vali-
dation, determination of error rates, or 
reliability testing to explain the limits 
of the discipline.”8 
In response to this high-level scien-
tific criticism, forensic scientists made 
some efforts to study the accuracy of 
their methods, although these efforts 
have been limited. The FBI commis-
sioned an important series of studies 
on the accuracy of latent print anal-
ysis, but relatively little research has 
been conducted on the accuracy of other 
forensic science disciplines. In 2016, 
the President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (PCAST) issued 
a report that reviewed scientific research 
published to that point on the accuracy 
of six forensic science disciplines that 
rely on “feature comparison”: DNA 
analysis, latent print analysis, firearms 
analysis, bitemarks analysis, footwear 
analysis, and microscopic hair analysis.9 
PCAST found that adequate research 
had been done to establish the “founda-
tional validity” of latent print analysis 
and DNA analysis of single-source and 
simple mixture samples. “Foundational 
validity” means the method in question 
is capable of producing accurate results 
when properly performed. PCAST 
concluded, however, that too little 
research had been published to establish 
the “foundational validity” of firearms 
analysis, bitemarks analysis, footwear 
analysis, microscopic hair analysis, and 
DNA analysis of complex mixtures. 
Moreover, even if latent print exam-
ination has “foundational validity,” the 
studies do not show that it is infallible 
(as examiners have claimed). The studies 
reviewed by PCAST showed that latent 
print examiners have: 
. . . a false-positive rate that is substantial 
and is likely to be higher than expected by 
many jurors based on longstanding claims 
about the infallibility of fingerprint 
analysis. The false-positive rate could be 
as high as [one] error in 306 cases [based 
on an FBI study] and [one] error in 18 
cases based on a study by another crime 
laboratory.10 
The studies reviewed by PCAST also 
showed substantial numbers of false 
exclusions.11 
In light of these developments, foren-
sic scientists have begun to change the 
way they describe their analytic process 
and report their conclusions. They can 
no longer credibly claim the ability to 
infallibly discern whether two compared 
sets of features share a unique pattern and 
thus have a common source. Professional 
associations and standards-setting bodies 
in various branches of forensic science 
have recommended that examiners avoid 
asserting that their conclusions are infal-
lible and avoid claiming that they can 
discern whether a pattern is unique.12 
Experts are now discussing a variety of 
new approaches to reporting. 
THE LOGIC OF FORENSIC INFERENCE 
To understand and evaluate the new 
approaches to reporting, it is neces-
sary to understand the logic of forensic 
inference — that is, the logical steps 
by which a forensic examiner proceeds 
from observations to conclusions. Let’s 
consider, as an example, the logical steps 
that lead a latent print examiner from 
the observation that two fingerprints 
have similar ridge patterns to conclu-
sions about whether they were made 
by the same finger. If examiners can no 
longer credibly claim that prints must 
necessarily have a common source if 
they appear to have “matching” ridge 
patterns, what conclusions can they 
reasonably draw? 
The new approaches all recognize that 
forensic inference requires an inductive 
line of reasoning, which entails consid-
eration of probabilities. The examiner 
must consider the probability of seeing 
the patterns observed in the impressions 
under two alternative hypotheses about 
their origin: (1) that the impressions 
have the same source (e.g., same finger, 
same tool); and (2) that the impressions 
have a different source. 
Suppose, for example, that a latent 
print examiner observes that two finger-
prints have similar patterns but with 
slight discrepancies. The examiner 
must consider how probable it would 
be to observe those particular patterns 
JUDICATURE                                          21
4
(including both similarities and discrep-
ancies) if the prints were made by the 
same finger. This might involve consid-
eration of the likelihood that slipping 
or torsion of the finger, or some other 
process, could have distorted one or 
both of the prints enough to produce 
the discrepancies. The examiner must 
also consider how probable it would 
be to observe those particular patterns 
(including both similarities and 
discrepancies) if the prints were made 
by different fingers. This would involve 
consideration of the rarity of the shared 
features, hence how likely or unlikely it 
would be to observe so much similarity 
in prints made by different fingers. 
In order to draw inferences and reach 
conclusions about whether two impres-
sions have a common source, the expert 
must consider the balance between the 
two key probabilities: (1) the probability 
of the observed patterns if the impres-
sions have the same source; and (2) the 
probability of the observed patterns if 
the impressions have a different source. 
The ratio between these two probabili-
ties provides an index of the probative 
value of the evidence for distinguishing 
the two hypotheses. The evidence favors 
a particular hypothesis to the extent 
that the observed results are more prob-
able under that hypothesis than under 
the alternative hypothesis. For exam-
ple, if a latent print examiner thinks the 
observed ridge patterns (including both 
similarities and discrepancies) would 
be more probable if the prints have the 
same source (same finger) than if they 
have a different source (different fingers), 
then the evidence supports the hypothe-
sis that the prints have the same source. 
This logic is fundamental and ines-
capable. It is the basis for any conclusions 
that examiners choose to report.
APPROACHES TO REPORTING
There are several schools of thought 
about how examiners should report 
their conclusions regarding the balance 
of probability. In this section of the 
article, we will outline the different 
approaches and discuss their strengths 
and weaknesses.
Likelihood Ratios. One approach that 
is popular in Europe allows examin-
ers to use numbers called likelihood 
ratios to describe their perception of the 
balance of probabilities.13 The likeli-
hood ratio represents the expert’s view of 
the relative probability of the observed 
features under the alternative hypothe-
ses about the source of the impressions. 
A likelihood ratio of 1000, for exam-
ple, represents the expert’s view that the 
observed patterns are 1000 times more 
probable under one hypothesis (e.g., 
same source) than under the alternative 
hypothesis. Experts typically make the 
favored hypothesis the numerator of the 
likelihood ratio so that reported values 
range from one to infinity. A value of one 
means the expert thinks the observed 
patterns are equally likely under the two 
hypotheses, and hence the evidence has 
no value for distinguishing the hypoth-
eses. A value greater than one means the 
expert thinks the observed patterns are 
more likely under one hypothesis than 
the alternative, and thus the forensic 
evidence supports the favored hypoth-
esis. The larger the likelihood ratio, 
the greater the expert’s perception of 
how strongly the balance of probabil-
ities supports the favored hypotheses. 
European latent print experts sometimes 
report very high likelihood ratio values, 
such as one million or even ten million.
The European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes (ENFSI) and the 
U.K. Royal Statistical Society promote 
the use of likelihood ratios to describe 
experts’ assessments of the strength 
of forensic evidence.14 Many forensic 
scientists in Europe, New Zealand, and 
parts of Australia also have adopted this 
approach.15 
The question most commonly asked 
about likelihood ratios is how the 
experts come up with the numbers they 
report. In some disciplines, experts can 
rely on databases and statistical model-
ing. This is most common in fields like 
forensic DNA analysis and forensic voice 
comparison, where extensive databases 
exist and methods for statistical model-
ing have been evaluated in the scientific 
literature.16 Likelihood ratios have been 
presented in the United States for many 
years in connection with forensic DNA 
evidence. The expert typically says 
something like the following: 
The genetic characteristics observed in 
the evidentiary sample are X times more 
likely if the defendant was a contribu-
tor than if the contributor was instead a 
random unknown Caucasian. 
In the past, there has been insufficient 
data on the rarity of the features observed 
by experts in most pattern-matching 
Professional  
associations and  
standards-setting 
bodies in various 
branches of 
forensic science 
have recommended 
that examiners avoid 
asserting that their 
conclusions are 
infallible and avoid 
claiming that they 
can discern whether 
a pattern is unique.
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disciplines to allow statistical esti-
mates, but that is starting to change. 
Recently the Defense Forensic Science 
Center (DFSC) of the Department of the 
Army began presenting probabilities in 
connection with fingerprint evidence. In 
March 2017, the laboratory announced 
that future reports would include state-
ments like the following:
The latent print on Exhibit ## and the 
standards bearing the name XXXX 
have corresponding ridge detail. The 
probability of observing this amount of 
correspondence is approximately ## times 
greater when impressions are made by 
the same source rather than by different 
sources.17
The laboratory uses a software 
program to score the similarity of the 
prints being compared based on “the 
spatial relationship and angles of the 
ridge details.”18 The program then uses 
a database to evaluate how much more 
common it is to observe a given simi-
larity score when comparing prints 
from the same finger than prints from 
different fingers. Although this is a 
novel method that has not yet been 
adopted by other forensic laborato-
ries, the DFSC has reportedly offered 
to share this software with any govern-
ment forensic laboratory in the United 
States, and other labs are evaluating 
this approach. Similar software-based, 
quantitative methods for assessing tool-
mark and handwriting evidence also are 
under development, although it may be 
a few years before they are ready for the 
courtroom. As experts begin offering 
testimony based on these new methods 
in United States courtrooms, litigants 
are likely to challenge admissibility 
under the Daubert or Frye standards, 
which will require judges to scrutinize 
whether the new methods are reliable 
and generally accepted. 
Likelihood ratios also can be reported 
in forensic science disciplines that have 
not developed databases and statisti-
cal models. In those fields, experts may 
rely on their training and experience to 
come up with a likelihood ratio. In some 
instances, a likelihood ratio can be based 
partly on empirical data and partly on 
the expert’s judgment.19 While some 
commentators have derided such esti-
mates as “subjective” and questioned 
their validity (one commentator called 
them “numbers from nowhere”20), the 
practice of presenting likelihood ratios 
based on expert judgment (rather than 
a database) appears to have taken hold 
in many European countries.21 Whether 
such testimony should be admitted in 
the United States is an issue judges may 
soon need to contemplate. 
Those who support the use of likeli-
hood ratios based on expert judgment 
(rather than databases) point out that 
a forensic examiner must make subjec-
tive judgments of probability in order 
to draw any conclusions about whether 
two items have a common source.22 If 
the examiner does not know enough to 
assess the relevant probabilities, then 
the examiner does not know enough 
to evaluate the strength of the foren-
sic evidence — and hence nothing the 
examiner says about the value of the 
evidence should be trusted. It makes no 
sense, proponents say, to allow experts 
to testify about conclusions they reached 
based on a subjective judgment of the 
balance of probabilities but not allow 
the expert to use a likelihood ratio to say 
what their judgment was. When experts 
report their judgments of the likelihood 
ratio, proponents argue, the expert’s 
judgmental process is more transpar-
ent, and hence the value of the expert’s 
conclusions is easier to evaluate.23 
Verbal Equivalents of Likelihood 
Ratios. Examiners may nevertheless 
be reluctant to put specific numbers 
on their subjective judgments, even if 
those judgments are well grounded. An 
examiner may justifiably believe that 
the observed results are more probable 
if the items being compared have the 
same source than a different source, for 
example, without being able to say with 
any precision how much more prob-
able. Forcing examiners to articulate 
numbers may lend a false air of precision 
to a subjective assessment.
One way to avoid this problem is to 
allow examiners to express conclusions 
about the balance of probabilities using 
words rather than numbers. In a 2012 
report, a group of experts assembled 
by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) recommended 
that latent print examiners report their 
conclusions using statements like the 
following:
It is far more probable that this degree 
of similarity would occur when compar-
ing the latent print with the defendant’s 
fingers than with someone else’s fingers.24
If the examiner does 
not know enough to 
assess the relevant 
probabilities, then  
the examiner does  
not know enough 
to evaluate the 
strength of the 
forensic evidence — 
and hence nothing 
the examiner says 
about the value of 
the evidence should 
be trusted. 
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This approach allows examiners to 
substitute an imprecise verbal statement 
(“far more probable”) for a number, while 
still explaining the strength of the foren-
sic evidence in terms of the balance of 
probabilities. Of course lawyers can (and 
should) ask experts testifying in this 
manner to explain what they mean by 
statements like “far more probable” and 
what basis they have for that conclusion. 
Another approach that has been 
popular in Europe substitutes words for 
numerical likelihood ratios. The U.K.-
based Association of Forensic Science 
Providers (AFSP) has proposed that foren-
sic scientists use the “verbal expressions” 
shown in Table 1 (above) to describe how 
strongly their evidence supports a partic-
ular hypothesis about the evidence (e.g., 
the hypothesis that two items have a 
common source).25 Under this approach, 
forensic scientists first come up with a 
likelihood ratio that reflects their percep-
tion of the balance of probabilities, and 
then use one of the verbal expressions in 
the table instead of (or in addition to) the 
number to describe their conclusions in 
reports and testimony.
For example, a forensic scientist 
who concludes (by whatever means) 
that the results observed in a forensic 
comparison are 500 times more likely if 
the items have a common source than if 
they have a different source would report 
that the comparison provides “moderately 
strong” support 
for the conclusion 
that the items 
have a common 
source. A foren-
sic scientist who 
concluded that 
the results are 
100,000 times 
more likely if the 
patterns being 
compared have a 
common source 
would say that the evidence provides 
“very strong support” for the hypothesis 
of a common source. Statements of this 
type are not common in U.S. courts, but 
they have been discussed extensively in 
the academic literature.26 They offer one 
possible answer to the question of how to 
report source conclusions.
 
Match Frequencies / Random Match 
Probabilities. When a comparison 
reveals matching features in two items, 
forensic scientists sometimes estimate 
and report the frequency of the match-
ing features in a reference population. 
This occurs most commonly in forensic 
DNA analysis, where genetic databases 
provide an empirical basis for assessing 
the proportion of a population that has 
a particular genetic feature. Forensic 
DNA analysts sometimes refer to these 
estimates as match frequencies (e.g., “The 
blood stain at the crime scene and the 
reference blood sample from the suspect 
have the same DNA profile. This profile 
is estimated to occur in one person in 10 
million among Caucasian-Americans.”). 
Alternatively, they may present these 
estimates as random match probabilities 
(RMPs) (e.g., “The probability that a 
random Caucasian-American would 
match this DNA profile is 0.0000001 
or 1 in 10 million.”). As forensic scien-
tists develop databases that can be used 
to quantify the rarity of pattern features, 
we are likely to see similar testimony in 
other pattern-matching disciplines. 
Even without empirical data, experts 
sometimes make statements about 
the random match probability based 
on training and experience. These 
subjective-match probabilities are typi-
cally reported with words rather than 
numbers. An examiner might say, for 
example, that the set of features shared 
by two items is “rare” or “unusual.” 
One drawback of this approach is that 
it addresses only one of the two ques-
tions needed to evaluate the balance of 
probabilities reflected in the likelihood 
ratio. It addresses the probability of the 
observed patterns under the hypothe-
sis that they have a different source. It 
fails to consider the probability of the 
observed patterns if the impressions 
have the same source. Consequently, 
this approach may be misleading in 
cases in which the latter probability is 
low, when, for instance, the patterns 
have important discrepancies as well as 
similarities. Likelihood ratios, which 
consider both probabilities, arguably 
offer a more balanced and complete 
account of the strength of such evidence. 
Source Probabilities. In the United 
States, forensic examiners often pres-
ent opinions on the probability that 
two items have a common source. 
Opinions of this type can be expressed 
quantitatively, using probabilities or 
percentages. For example, a forensic 
scientist might say there is a 99 percent 
chance that two items have a common 
source. It is more common, however, for 
examiners to express such conclusions 
with words rather than numbers. For 
example, the forensic scientist might 
say it is “moderately probable,” “highly 
probable,” or “practically certain” that 
two items have a common source.
Lawyers and judges tend to like 
source probabilities because they are 
TABLE 1. PROPOSED LIKELIHOOD RATIO TERMINOLOGY (AFSP, 2009)
 NUMERICAL EXPRESSION OF  VERBAL EXPRESSION OF
 PROBATIVE STRENGTH PROBATIVE STRENGTH
 (likelihood ratio)
 1 – 10 Weak or limited
 10 – 100 Moderate
 100 – 1,000 Moderately strong
 1000 – 10,000 Strong
 10,000 – 1,000,000 Very strong
 > 1,000,000 Extremely strong
easy to understand; they address the 
exact question that the trier of fact 
needs to assess — how likely it is that 
the two impressions (e.g., two finger-
prints) come from the same source? 
The problem, unfortunately, is that the 
information forensic scientists can glean 
from a comparison of impressions is 
not, by itself, sufficient to allow them 
to reach conclusions about source prob-
ability. As we will explain, examiners 
can logically draw conclusions about 
source probabilities only by combining 
conclusions drawn from a comparison 
of the impressions with assumptions 
or conclusions about the strength of 
other evidence that bears on the ques-
tion of whether the impressions being 
compared have a common source.27 
To illustrate, consider the Elvis 
Problem discussed in the sidebar. What 
is the probability that Elvis Presley was 
the source of the evidence left at the 
crime scene? As explained, this ques-
tion cannot be answered based on the 
forensic science evidence alone. It is 
only by making assumptions or drawing 
conclusions about the likelihood of Elvis 
being at the crime scene — a matter 
having nothing to do with the foren-
sic science evidence — that the forensic 
examiner can draw conclusions about the 
probability that Elvis was the source. 
The same problem arises whenever 
forensic scientists express opinions 
on source probabilities. The opinion 
must, of logical necessity, depend in 
part on conclusions or assumptions 
about matters having nothing to do 
with forensic science, such as whether 
the person who is alleged to have left a 
trace (e.g., a fingerprint or shoeprint) at 
the crime scene is a likely or unlikely 
suspect and how many other people 
had access to the crime scene. Forensic 
examiners are not in a good position to 
make such judgments and have no busi-
ness doing so anyway. 
Identification and Exclusion. In the 
United States, the most popular method 
of reporting results of forensic compari-
sons is to state a bottom-line conclusion 
about whether two traces have a common 
source. The conclusion that two traces 
have the same source is often described 
as “identification” or “individualiza-
tion,” while a conclusion that they have 
a different source is “exclusion.” These 
conclusions can be seen as extreme 
examples of source probabilities, corre-
sponding to either a 100 percent or a 
zero percent chance that the traces being 
compared have the same source. 
The demise of the theory of discernible 
uniqueness has made these conclusions 
more difficult to justify. Most experts 
now acknowledge that these conclusions 
require the examiner to make a decision 
about whether the evidence is strong 
enough to support a definitive conclu-
sion, but there does not appear to be a 
generally accepted theory regarding how 
experts should make that decision. 
One approach requires experts to 
make an assessment of the source proba-
bility. They report “identification” when 
their assessed source probability exceeds 
some high threshold and “exclusion” 
when their assessment falls below some 
low threshold. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, however, the assessment of 
source probabilities requires the expert 
to make assumptions or draw conclu-
sions about matters beyond the forensic 
comparison in question. Experts cannot 
draw conclusions about source probabil-
ities without facing the Elvis Problem, 
which renders such conclusions prob-
lematic. If courts allow experts to present 
conclusions reached in this manner, they 
should also require experts to disclose 
the factual basis for their asserted source 
probabilities. To evaluate the expert’s 
conclusion, the trier-of-fact will need to 
know the extent to which the expert’s 
decision was influenced by assumptions 
or conclusions about matters beyond the 
realm of forensic science. 
To avoid the Elvis Problem, foren-
sic scientists might instead base their 
decision on their judgment of the 
balance of probabilities. If they believe 
the balance weighs strongly enough in 
favor of the hypothesis that the items 
being compared have the same source, 
then they might report “identifica-
tion.” If they believe the balance weighs 
strongly enough in favor of the hypoth-
esis that the items have a different 
source, then they might report “exclu-
sion.” This approach avoids the need for 
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stand the expert’s 
conclusions, the 
Trier-of-fact will 
need to know how  
the expert evaluated 
the relevant  
probabilities, and  
how, where, and  
why the expert  
set the threshold 
for reporting a 
particular decision. 
The trier-of-fact 
also will need  
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the accuracy of 
decisions reached  
in this manner. 
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Imagine that a bloodstain of recent origin is 
found at the scene of a crime. Imagine further 
that the DNA profile of the bloodstain is 
somehow determined to be the same as the 
DNA profile of rock-and-roll legend Elvis 
Presley. Finally, imagine that the DNA profile in question is one million times more likely to be observed 
if the sample came from Elvis than if it came from a random person. Based on the DNA evidence, what can 
the examiner logically infer about the probability that the crime scene stain came from Elvis Presley? 
	 A	moment	of	reflection	should	be	sufficient	to	realize	that	the	examiner	can	draw	no	conclusion	about	
the	probability	 that	 the	 crime	scene	stain	 came	 from	Elvis	based	on	 the	DNA	evidence	alone;	 the	exam-
iner	must	 also	 consider	 other	matters,	 such	 as	whether	 Elvis	 could	plausibly	be	 the	 source.	 In	 this	 case,	
the	suspect	(Elvis)	has	a	strong	alibi	—	he	was	widely	reported	to	have	died	in	1977.	If	the	forensic	scientist	
believes	this	“alibi,”	then	the	probability	that	the	bloodstain	came	from	Elvis	is	necessarily	zero.	
	 An	examiner	who	believes	Elvis	is	dead	might	decide	to	report	that	there	is	a	zero	percent	chance	the	crime	
scene	sample	came	from	Elvis.	Notice,	however,	that	this	conclusion	is	not	based	on	
the	strength	of	the	DNA	evidence.	It	depends	entirely	on	the	expert’s	
assessment	of	matters	beyond	the	realm	of	forensic	science	—	in	this	
case	Elvis’s	alibi.
	 The	expert	might	try	to	take	a	neutral	position	on	the	alibi	—	assum-
ing,	for	example,	that	the	question	of	whether	Elvis	could	have	been	the	
source	is	a	toss-up	or	50:50	chance.	When	this	seemingly	neutral	assump-
tion	about	the	truth	of	the	alibi	is	taken	as	a	starting	point,	the	expert	can	
update	the	initial	assessment	in	light	of	the	DNA	evidence.	That	approach	
leads	logically	to	the	conclusion	that	there	is	more	than	a	99	percent	chance	
that	Elvis	was	the	source	of	the	blood.32	Notice,	however,	that	this	conclusion	
depends	only	partly	on	the	DNA	evidence;	it	also	depends	critically	on	the	assump-
tion	of	a	50	percent	chance	a priori that	the	blood	at	the	crime	scene	came	from	
Elvis	(an	assumption	many	people	will	view	as	fanciful).	Should	forensic	scien-
tists	be	basing	their	conclusions	on	assumptions	of	this	type?	
 The	problem	(as	should	now	be	clear)	is	that	no	assumption	about	the	prob-
ability	of	an	alibi’s	veracity	can	truly	be	considered	“neutral.”	Yet	without	
some	assumption	 about	 the	probability	 of	 the	 alibi’s	 veracity,	 there	 is	 no	
logical	way	to	assess	the	probability	that	Elvis	was	the	source.	
	This	same	logical	conundrum	arises	in	any	case	in	which	a	forensic	scientist	is	asked	to	assess	
the	probability	that	a	particular	suspect	was	the	source	of	a	crime	scene	sample	based	on	a	
forensic	comparison.	The	expert	can	never	answer	the	question	based	solely	on	the	forensic	
evidence.	Inevitably	the	expert	must	make	assumptions	or	take	a	position	on	other	matters,	
such	as	the	probability	that	the	suspect’s	alibi	is	true.	Doing	that	may	well	invade	the	jury’s	
province;	 it	 certainly	 requires	 the	expert	 to	delve	 into	matters	beyond	his	or	her	 scientific	
expertise.	Consequently,	judges	should	consider	carefully	whether	to	admit	statements	
about	source	probabilities	into	evidence.	If	such	statements	are	admitted,	judges	
(and	lawyers)	should	try	to	make	clear	to	the	jury	the	extent	to	which	the	expert’s	
conclusions	depend	on	comparison	of	the	items	in	question,	and	the	extent	to	
which	they	depend	on	assumptions	or	conclusions	about	other	matters.	
ELVIS’S ALIBI
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the expert to evaluate source probabil-
ities, but it still raises many questions. 
In order to understand the expert’s 
conclusions, the trier-of-fact will need 
to know how the expert evaluated the 
relevant probabilities, and how, where, 
and why the expert set the threshold 
for reporting a particular decision. The 
trier-of-fact also will need information 
about the accuracy of decisions reached 
in this manner. 
In the past, expert forensic science 
testimony about “identification” and 
“exclusion” often went unchallenged, 
with lawyers on both sides assuming 
such testimony was reliable and uncon-
troversial. As lawyers become more 
aware of the issues discussed in this 
article, we expect they will examine the 
logic and basis of such conclusions far 
more closely than they have in the past.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF STATISTICAL  
DATA ON ERROR RATES
Regardless of how forensic scientists 
choose to present their conclusions, 
we also expect in the near future to see 
more testimony about the error rates 
of pattern-matching disciplines. The 
2016 PCAST report argued forcefully 
that empirical research is the only way 
to assess the accuracy (and hence the 
probative value) of examiners’ source 
conclusions: 
Without appropriate estimates of accu-
racy, an examiner’s statement that two 
samples are similar — or even indistin-
guishable — is scientifically meaningless: 
it has no probative value, and considerable 
potential for prejudicial impact. Nothing 
— not training, personal experience nor 
professional practices — can substitute 
for adequate empirical demonstration of 
accuracy.28
PCAST called for a continuing 
program of research in which examin-
ers are tested by having them compare 
samples from known sources. PCAST 
recommended that the samples used 
in the research be representative of the 
samples encountered in casework, that 
examiners have no information about 
the correct answer, that independent 
groups with no stake in the outcome 
conduct multiple studies, and that the 
data be available to other scientists for 
review.29 Courts will need to consider 
the results of such studies when decid-
ing whether testimony about forensic 
comparisons is sufficiently trustworthy 
to be admitted — whether, in the words 
of Rule 702(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, it is “the product of reliable 
principles and methods.”30 
When such testimony is admit-
ted, error-rate data will be relevant for 
assessing its probative value. PCAST 
suggested that testimony about error 
rates of the relevant forensic method, 
as research has shown on samples like 
those in the case at hand, should always 
be presented in conjunction with testi-
mony about the results of forensic 
comparisons. Experts are likely to be 
asked about error rates during cross-ex-
amination even if the proponent of the 
forensic evidence elects not to pres-
ent error-rate data in direct testimony. 
Lawyers are likely to debate the implica-
tions and significance of error-rate data 
for evaluating the probability that an 
error occurred in the case at hand.
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We are thus on the cusp of a new era 
for forensic science — an era in which 
statistics will inevitably play a greater 
role. Oliver Wendell Holmes once 
declared that “the man of the future 
is the man of statistics . . . . ”31 In the 
pattern-matching disciplines of forensic 
science, that future has arrived. 
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WHAT AN HONOR IT IS FOR ME TO GREET YOU AS THE INAUGURAL 
DIRECTOR OF THE BOLCH JUDICIAL INSTITUTE OF DUKE LAW SCHOOL. 
As you will read in this journal, Carl and Susan Bolch have endowed this Institute to 
support and promote the study of courts and judicial decision-making, institutional design 
and reform, and, above all, the rule of law and the role of an independent judiciary in 
upholding the rule of law. It is a wonderful and broad mission that touches upon many areas 
of scholarship and law reform and opens up many avenues for collaboration, teaching, and 
field work. An effective, fair judicial and legal system is the foundation of any prosperous 
and functioning economy and culture. But it is not permanent or impervious to decay. 
This Institute will study the rule 
of law, how it is achieved, described, 
measured, and protected, and how it 
can be advanced to promote justice, 
nonviolence, and international order. 
We will study how technology and 
innovation can advance the rule of 
law and human rights, improve the 
administration of justice, and help 
provide access to justice. And we 
will share the results of our endeav-
ors with judiciaries and governments 
around the world.
These are big and consequential 
topics. Fortunately, we have a deep 
“bench” of scholars here at Duke, 
both at the law school and throughout the university, who are leaders and experts in these 
fields. We also are eager to work with other organizations around the world. We aspire to 
connect scholarly research to the large network of organizations that are already actively 
involved in fostering the rule of law on the ground. And we will look to the judiciary and 
the legal profession to join and enhance our efforts. 
Judicature will continue to flourish under the umbrella of the Bolch Judicial Institute. 
As before, it will explore the administration of justice and the practice of judging. It will 
continue to offer scholarship that is relevant to the courts, insight that can inform and 
advance the work of the judiciary, and perspectives that challenge us to broader under-
standing. This edition’s cover story on forensic science is a good example of how scholar-
ship and research can affect the decisions judges make on a day-to-day basis. The Bolch 
Judicial Institute’s renewed focus on judicial independence recalls Judicature’s original 
purpose as the magazine of the American Judicature Society, which was dedicated to 
promoting an independent judiciary insulated from the pressure of electoral politics. As 
it renews this focus, the Bolch Judicial Institute will work to expand Judicature’s reach 
within the legal profession and academy in the United States and around the world. 
I am grateful for your support of this journal and look forward to working with you 
to pursue these important goals. Please send your comments and ideas, on this journal 
and on the future of the Bolch Judicial Institute, to judicature@law.duke.edu or to me 
directly at levi@law.duke.edu. 
David F. Levi
James B. Duke and Benjamin N. Duke Dean, Duke Law School
Director, Bolch Judicial Institute 
ì The rule of law is the foundation for the stability of society, human rights, a grow­
ing economy and fl ourishing culture and artistic life. An independent judiciary 
and a societyís  belief in the fairness of its justice system are critical to preserving 
and protecting the rule of law.î !!"!#$%&!'(&#)!*%+
Welcome to the spring edition of Judicature. This edition includes an announcement 
of a very significant gift to benefit Duke’s judicial studies programs and Judicature: a $10 
million gift from Duke alumnus Carl Bolch Jr. and his wife, Susan Bass Bolch, to establish 
the Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law School. The institute will focus on the important 
and unique mission of promoting the rule of law and the value of a fair and independent 
judiciary in the U.S. and around the world. The Bolch Judicial Institute also will support 
the Master of Judicial Studies Program, which will graduate its third class this May — 
myself included. On behalf of the judges in the master’s program, I offer a special thank 
you to the Bolches for this extraordinary gift. We have 
benefited greatly from our experience at Duke, and it 
is wonderful to know that many more judges, in the 
United States and abroad, will now have the opportu-
nity to participate in Duke’s programs.
This edition of Judicature also features three articles 
that analyze the validity of forensic methods used in 
the court system. With data from recent reports by the 
National Research Council, the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology, and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, these arti-
cles note that many widely used forensic disciplines 
do not meet standards of scientific validity applied in 
scientific research and explore the challenge for courts 
and lawyers in managing forensic testimony in light of 
these claims of fallibility. 
Other articles offer an account of how the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is addressing the ever-important issue of judi-
cial health and a perspective on canons of construction and judicial writing from Bryan 
Garner, who offers a lively response to an article published in the winter edition of 
Judicature by Joseph Kimble. In keeping with the tradition of Judicature, this edition 
includes another installment of the Storied Third Branch, “Icon of the Bench and 
Gridiron,” honoring the life of Florida Seventh Judicial Circuit Judge Kim Hammond 
and written by Judge Hammond’s good friend and chief judge of the Seventh Judicial 
Circuit, Raul Zambrano. Our Point-Counterpoint for this edition highlights Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a case pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court; two religious liberty scholars, professors Frank Ravitch and Brett Scharffs, 
provide differing perspectives on the case’s implications. Finally, one of Florida’s finest 
appellate court judges (and my colleague in the LLM program), Spencer Levine of the 
Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal, provides a book review of Lead Yourself First, 
Inspiring Leadership Through Solitude, by Judge Raymond Kethledge of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and co-author Michael Erwin.
It has been my pleasure to serve as the editor in chief of this edition of Judicature. Once 
again, on behalf of the May 2018 graduating class of the Judicial Studies Program, special 
thanks to Mr. and Mrs. Bolch for their wonderful gift to support judicial studies at Duke 
and to continue to give judges the incredible opportunity that I and my fellow members of 
the Class of 2018 have enjoyed. 
Joe Boatwright, Judge, Putnam County, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Florida
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